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Congress' Pet: Why the Clean Air Act's Favoritism  
of California Is Unconstitutional Under the  
Equal Footing Doctrine 
Valerie J. M. Brader* 
Abstract 
The Clean Air Act gives two regulatory powers to one state — 
California — that it forbids to all others: the power to regulate fuels, 
and the power to regulate motor vehicle construction.  This paper 
makes the novel argument that by creating a differential in power be-
tween the states, these provisions violate the equal footing doctrine, 
and are therefore unconstitutional.  In doing so, it provides the his-
tory of the doctrine, a foundational principle that pre-dates the Con-
stitution and remains the law of the land today.  Though the doctrine 
has been relegated to a bit part in modern jurisprudential debates, 
this article shows its vitality and power, and argues its re-emergence 
should begin with a rejection of the Clean Air Act's California prefer-
ences. 
I. Introduction
Under several provisions of the Clean Air Act ("CAA"),1 California
has powers denied to all other states to regulate in the air quality 
arena.2  Because of these provisions, federal courts have repeatedly 
halted attempts by other states to enforce regulations California 
would be permitted to make and enforce.3  This outcome is not sim-
ply unjust — it is illegal, because the provisions of the CAA that give 
California its special status are unconstitutional.  By giving California 
* Ms. Brader, a member of the Michigan, Eastern District of Michigan, and Sixth
Circuit bars, is currently a clerk for the Hon. John Feikens (E.D.Mich.).  Formerly, Ms. 
Brader was an environmental consultant with Booz Allen Hamilton and the staff as-
sistant for natural resources for Gov. Phil Batt (R-Idaho).  A Rhodes Scholar, she 
holds an A.B. magna cum laude in Government (Harvard University), an M.Sc. in Envi-
ronmental Change and Management (University of Oxford), an M.St. in Historical Re-
search (University of Oxford), and a J.D. magna cum laude (Georgetown University). 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2000).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (CAA § 177); 42 U.S.C. 7543(b), (e), (CAA § 209); 42 U.S.C.
7545(c)(4)(B), (CAA § 211) 
3. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Jorling, 710 F.Supp.421, 431 (N.D.N.Y. 1989).
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the power to regulate in the air quality arena but denying other states 
the same sovereignty, these provisions violate the equal footing doc-
trine, which holds that all the states of the Union have equal dignity 
and sovereignty. 
In this paper, I begin by outlining the provisions of the Clean Air 
Act that are intended to differentiate the power of the States, and ex-
amine the legislative history regarding these provisions and the un-
ease many members of Congress felt about one state having powers 
denied to the others.  Following that, I discuss the unsuccessful court 
challenges to these preferences that have been brought by less fa-
vored states.  Turning to the equal footing doctrine's history, I begin 
by discussing the founder's debate about whether the states of the 
Union should be equals, concluding that both sides of the debate 
would not support the current state of affairs.  The history of the doc-
trine in the legislative branch, dating from the Continental Congress 
through the first Congress and many Congresses since, follows.  I fin-
ish the focus on the equal footing doctrine by tracing its long history 
in the Supreme Court and noting some modern attempts to use the 
doctrine in the appellate courts.  I close by analyzing the application 
of the equal footing doctrine to the CAA sections giving preference to 
California. 
II. California's Special Treatment in the Clean Air Act
Unlike other U.S. pollution laws,4 the CAA does not permit
states to be "laboratories" that test out stricter regulations on engine 
emissions or the content of fuels that impact pollution production. 
As detailed below, the exception to this is California, which is al-
lowed to create regulations stricter than that of the federal govern-
ment.  Other states can choose to adopt the California standards or 
be subject to those set by the Environmental Protection Administra-
tion ("EPA").  The legislative history of these provisions shows a ten-
sion between the desire to have a single, federal standard for the 
benefit of many national industries and the desire by some states for 
very strict standards that would be unnecessary for (or unpalatable 
to) other states.  While only a few judicial challenges to these provi-
sions have been made (and no challenge has been made under either 
the equal footing doctrine or the delegation doctrine), existing juris-
4. E.g., The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(C) (2006) (". . . any
more stringent limitation . . . established pursuant to any State law . . . ."); 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act, 42 U.S.C. 9614(a) (2006) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed or 
interpreted as preempting any State from imposing any additional liability 
or requirements with respect to the release of hazardous substances within 
such State."). 
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prudence shows the desire of states to exercise those powers that 
California possesses, and a firm belief by courts that the CAA does 
not allow them to do so. 
A. Statutory Provisions
The ability of states to regulate features of new motor vehicles
that impact emissions is governed by sections 209 and 177 of the 
CAA.5  Section 209 provides, in part, that states may not "adopt or at-
tempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions 
from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines."6  There are 
two exceptions to this provision.  The first is also found in section 
209, which provides that any state that adopted standards prior to 
March 30, 1966, can set standards that are more stringent than the 
federal government's standards, as long as those standards meet 
three conditions: (1) they are not arbitrary and capricious; (2) they are 
needed to "meet compelling and extraordinary conditions" and (3) 
the standards and their enforcement procedures do not clash with 
the federal standards set by 42 USC 7521(a).7  As Congress knew when 
this law was enacted in 1970, California is the only state that promul-
gated such regulations before March 30, 1966.8 
The other exception to section 209's prohibition of state regula-
tory power is found in section 177, and was added in 1977.  That sec-
tion deals with regulation of vehicle engines in areas, called non-
attainment areas, where pollution causes air quality to fall below 
federal standards.9  The language of this provision makes the prefer-
ence for California all the more blatant: 
[A]ny State . . . may adopt and enforce for any model year
standards relating to control of new motor vehicles or mo-
tor vehicle engines. . .if:
(1) such standards are identical to the California stan-
dards for which a waiver has been granted for such model
year; and
(2) California and such State adopt such standards at
least two years before commencement of such model
year.
Nothing in this section . . . shall be construed as authoriz-
ing any such State to prohibit or limit, directly or indi-
5. 42 U.S.C. § 7543.
6. Id. § 7543(a).
7. Id. § 7543(b).
8. S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 32 (1970).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 7507.
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rectly, the manufacture and sale of a new motor vehicle or 
motor vehicle engine that is certified in California as 
meeting California standards, or to take any action of any 
kind to create, or have the effect of creating, a motor vehi-
cle or motor vehicle engine different from a motor vehicle 
or motor vehicle engine certified in California under Cali-
fornia standards (a 'third vehicle') or otherwise create 
such a "third vehicle."10 
In other words, after 1977, there are two types of vehicles per-
mitted by federal laws from which states can choose: a first vehicle 
that meets EPA standards, or a second vehicle that meets California 
standards, as determined by California. 
Non-road engines are also governed by section 209.  That provi-
sion begins by saying "[n]o state or any political subdivision thereof 
shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard or other requirement 
relating to the control of emissions" that are intended to regulate 
non-road engines in farm equipment and locomotives.11  However, a 
qualification to that provision is found in section 209(e)(2)(A), which 
again gives California a named exception: 
[T]he Administrator [of the EPA] shall, after notice and
opportunity for public hearing, authorize California to
adopt and enforce standards and other requirements re-
lating to the control of emissions from such vehicles or
engines if California determines that California standards
will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public
health and welfare as applicable Federal standards.  No
such authorization shall be granted if the Administrator
finds that –
(i) the determination of California is arbitrary and capri-
cious;
(ii) California does not need such standards to meet
compelling and extraordinary conditions, or
(iii) California standards and accompanying enforcement
procedures are not consistent with this section.12
As with on-road vehicles and engines, in 1977 other states were 
given the power to adopt standards "identical" to that of California in 
lieu of federal standards.13 
10. Id. § 7507.
11. Id. § 7543(e)(1).
12. Id. § 7543(e)(2)(A).
13. Id. § 7543(e)(2)(B)(i).
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The final provision that gives California special status compared 
to other states is section 211, which deals with regulation of fuels. 
Under that provision, no state can set regulations requiring the use of 
fuel additives or particular fuels as long as a federal standard has 
been promulgated, unless the state's regulations are "identical" to 
federal regulations set by the EPA.14  One exception to this rule is 
found in section 211(c)(4)(B), which allows any state with a waiver 
under section 7543(b) — the waiver only California is eligible for15 — 
"[to] at any time prescribe and enforce, for the purpose of motor ve-
hicle emission control, a control or prohibition respecting any fuel or 
fuel additive."16  Unlike the other provisions, this exception does not 
allow states to adopt California standards in lieu of federal stan-
dards. 
B. Congressional Debates about California's Special Status
1. 1970
The debates in the House of Representatives, and to a lesser
degree those of the Senate, explain the reasoning behind such provi-
sions.  At the time the 1970 debates were taking place, the only state 
which had imposed restrictions on the construction of new motor ve-
hicles was California, which represented ten percent of the auto mar-
ket.17  There was pressure to adopt those standards as the minimum 
required nationwide, but the federal government had not previously 
chosen to set such exacting standards.18 
During the debate in the House of Representatives, some ar-
gued against the special treatment of California, and that all states 
should have the same powers.  Representative John Saylor of Penn-
sylvania proposed an amendment to allow any state to pass regula-
tions that would exceed the federal standards, arguing that 
Pennsylvania's and New York's air quality problems were worse than 
those of California and his home state should also have the power to 
pass regulations that exceeded the federal standard.19  Another repre-
sentative indicated that the air in Los Angeles was nearly five times 
worse than that of any other place in the nation.20  Representative 
Sidney Yates, a Democrat from Illinois, spoke in favor of the amend-
14. Id. § 7545(4)(A).
15. S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 32 (1970).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(B).
17. 91 Cong. Rec. 116, 19219 (1970) (statement of Rep. Farbstein).
18. Id.
19. Id., 19231-2.
20. Id., 19232 (statement of Rep. Springer).
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ment, arguing that his home state might also wish to pass such regu-
lation.  Ultimately, the feelings of those in favor of the amendment 
were summed up by Representative Leonard Farbstein, a Democrat 
from New York, who said he supported the amendment because it 
was meant to ensure "that the other States of the Union have the 
same right that the State of California has in setting standards that 
they deem necessary for the health and safety of their people."21 
Another representative argued that data available to Congress 
indicated that the air in Los Angeles was nearly five times worse than 
that of any other place in the nation.  Representative Springer, the 
most vocal opponent of Representative Saylor's amendment and a 
Republican from Illinois, had the following justification for his argu-
ment: 
Mr. SPRINGER. This was gone into in great detail.  I will 
not go into all of it here as to why it was, but it was felt 
that you could not have 50 different emission standards. 
That is the reason, and that could conceivably happen 
 . . . . Because he will let any locality that wants to set up 
its own emission standards.  When you do that it means 
that you cannot drive from one county to another in Illi-
nois, just the same as you could not drive in 50 different 
States, and you would have all different laws . . . May I 
say that we would not have done it in the State of Cali-
fornia except in one county that has had the worst situa-
tion in the world, with the possible exception of London. 
There was a good reason for the exception of California.22 
Others argued that leaving air quality decisions to the states 
would abrogate the federal responsibility to ensure healthy air and 
relieve the pressure on the federal government to set exacting stan-
dards.23  After a lengthy debate, those who argued that allowing all 
states to regulate would be an abrogation of the federal responsibil-
ity to ensure healthy air and that 50 standards would be a practical 
nightmare prevailed.  The amendment failed on a vote of 49 ayes, 79 
noes.24  After the vote, three representatives offered an amendment to 
make California standards those of the nation, arguing that the resi-
dents of New York should not be denied the benefits those in Cali-
fornia enjoyed, but it too failed.25 
21. 91 Cong. Rec. 116, 19232.
22. Id., 19224.
23. Id.  See, e.g., final remarks of Rep. Springer.
24. Id., 19237.
25. H.R. Rep. No. 91-1146, at 52-53 (1970).
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When the bill reached the Senate, there was no challenge to 
California's special status on the floor as there had been in the 
House.  However, supporters again defended California's special 
status, relying heavily on the argument that California's air quality 
problems were much more severe than those in the rest of the coun-
try and noting that California had more cars per capita than any other 
state.26  A committee report noted that the automobile industry ar-
gued that making California's standards the national standard would 
be inappropriate because "California's problem of automotive air pol-
lution was unique and that different degrees of control for different 
pollutants would be needed to deal with problems in other areas of 
the nation."27  The report went on to note that the bill as proposed 
contained federal pre-emption to "prevent a multiplicity of State 
standards for emissions control systems on new motor vehicles" and 
the California exemption existed due to "unusual instances."28 
Following a conference committee to resolve differences, the bill 
was passed by both chambers with the California exemptions intact. 
President Nixon signed the bill into law on December 31, 1970. 
2. 1977 Debates
In 1977, the California preference again engendered debate in
Congress.  A proposed amendment to the Clean Air Act, later 
adopted, was offered to give all states the power to choose between 
California's standards or the federal standards, but not to allow 
states to set their own standards.  The debate over this amendment 
led to an exchange on the floor of the House of Representatives 
where members in favor of allowing states the ability to choose be-
tween the two standards used states' rights arguments to defend that 
position, and those opposing it raised the specter of a nightmare of 
interstate commerce where cars bought in one state would be illegal 
just across the border. 
At one point, Representative Timothy Wirth of Colorado debated 
the question of the constitutionality of the California preference with 
Representative John Dingell of Michigan: 
Mr. WIRTH. [C]ould the gentleman tell me how the abil-
ity of the State of California or the State of Colorado or 
the State of Michigan, or wherever it may be, to set its 
26. 91 Cong. Rec. 116, 33091 (statement of Sen. Murphy).  See also id., 42520
(remarks of Rep. Corman) and id., 42521 (remarks of Rep. Holifield). 
27. S. Rep. No. 91-1196 at 24  (1970).
28. Id. at 32.
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own standard is unconstitutional, as the gentleman is 
suggesting? What is unconstitutional about that? 
Mr. DINGELL. The Constitution provides that whenever 
the Federal Government speaks the States are not able to 
act in that area and we have done so in the Clean Air Act, 
except with a special exemption which we have enacted 
for the State of California, and then I have just described 
the penalties as a result of that.29 
Thus, although Dingell addressed the constitutionality of Con-
gress' power to govern interstate commerce, he did not address the 
heart of Wirth's question, which went to the equal powers of the state 
and the unconstitutionality of a grant of power to a single state de-
nied to all other states.  Representative Andrew Maguire of New Jer-
sey next took up Wirth's argument, beginning one exchange by noting 
that his state was the most densely populated, and had large pollu-
tion problems related to traffic.  He went on to say: "My State wants 
to be able to do what California is doing, and as I understand it some 
other States might also wish to do so. Why should we not be permit-
ted to do that?"30  Others likewise took up the argument: "[I]t seems 
to me that we should not deny the right we have given to California 
to other States with similar problems . . . . [W]e have one State right 
now, [Colorado], which has specific problems today over in the city of 
Denver.  Are we going to tell them they cannot solve their pollution 
problems, just as California is solving theirs?"31 
The states' rights arguments prevailed, and the amendment to 
allow non-California states the additional power to select California's 
standard or the federal standard was adopted, and became section 
177. However, Congress never addressed whether allowing the State
of California the power to set a national standard, while denying that
power to all other states, was itself a violation of the Constitution.
The statutory language granting California preference has not been
altered or added to since that time.
C. Attempting to Assume Equal Powers
Following the passage of the CAA, states attempted to go be-
yond the EPA-promulgated standards in ways California was permit-
ted to do.  Although two states waged a court battle in defense of 
their standards, neither was successful.  New York attempted to regu-
29. 95 Cong. Rec. 123, 16676.  Rep. Dingell had previously given the rationale
for the California preference as a way to respond to the uniquely severe pollution of 
that state.  Id. 
30. Id., 16676.
31. Id., 16677 (remarks of Rep. Carter).
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late fuels, as California would be permitted to do in the late 1980s.  In 
the 1990s, both Massachusetts and New York attempted to regulate 
the construction of new vehicles in ways which differed from Califor-
nia's regulations, although California had proposed, (but then 
dropped, a similar regulation. 
1. Regulating Fuels — The Jorling Decision
In the late 1980s, the State of New York attempted to regulate
fuel volatility in ways that exceeded federal standards and did not 
match the regulations of California.32  However, the American Petro-
leum Institute sued in federal court, arguing that the regulations con-
travened the CAA's prohibition against any fuel regulation by a state 
other than California, and therefore violated the Supremacy Clause of 
the Constitution.33  The Institute also argued that because the regula-
tion would unduly burden interstate commerce, the regulation vio-
lated the Dormant Commerce Clause.34 
Judge Thomas McAvoy of the Northern District of New York 
heard the Institute's motion for a preliminary injunction and New 
York's cross-motion for dismissal.  The court found that because New 
York's regulations were more restrictive than those promulgated by 
the EPA, the conclusion that the Supremacy Clause applied and the 
state's regulations therefore must yield was "inescapable."35  Having 
so found, the court did not address the Dormant Commerce Clause 
argument.  Although the court denied the injunction on the basis 
that irreparable harm had not been shown, it left the state defendant 
little hope that its regulation could survive without EPA choosing to 
adopt it.36 
2. Regulating Vehicles — The Zero-Emission Vehicle Cases
In the mid to late 1990s, New York was again testing the limits,
but this time it had company — Massachusetts.  Both states, on EPA 
orders,37 attempted to enact a regulation called the "Zero Emission 
Vehicle" standard.  California had promulgated such a regulation in 
32. See 6 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. § 225-3 (2006).
33. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Jorling, 710 F. Supp. 421 (N.D.N.Y. 1989).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 429.
36. Id. at 431.
37. Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1401 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding the require-
ment to adopt California standards to be invalid as beyond EPA’s authority.  New 
York and Massachusetts governors did not vote against the requirement to adopt 
California vehicle standards for their states). 
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1990,38 and gained the required waiver from the EPA in 1993.39  How-
ever, California removed the "Zero Emission Vehicle" standard in 
regulating the 1988-2000 vehicle classes.40  The states of New York 
and Massachusetts both attempted to retain this standard despite 
California's pullback, arguing the standard they adopted was accept-
able because it had been identical to one approved for use in Califor-
nia.41  However federal courts ruled that because the state's standards 
for the vehicle class at issue did not exactly match those of Califor-
nia's, the standards were invalid as contrary to the CAA.42 
In summary, the CAA's preference for California, clearly present 
in the statute, was challenged in Congress at the time of its adoption 
as unfair to other states.  Although states other than California have 
attempted to enact regulations that California would be allowed to 
enforce under its special powers, the courts have held firm to the in-
tent of Congress: a preference for California which prevents other 
states from doing what California may do.  The next section of this 
paper discusses why such a preference is unconstitutional. 
III. Equal Footing Doctrine: History and Modern Structure
In 1845, a Supreme Court justice called a dispute that revolved
around the equal footing doctrine "the most important controversy 
ever brought before this court."43  More recently, however, the doc-
trine granting newly formed states equal status has not been so grip-
ping — it fact, it is cited as one of the most boring areas of law with 
which the Supreme Court must contend.44  Nevertheless, dramatic re-
versals are not unusual in the doctrine's history..  The Constitutional 
Convention seemed to reverse its decisions on whether to refer to 
equal footing every time it voted, finally settling on an ambiguous 
comprise.  Then, for nearly half of this country's history, the Supreme 
Court wavered between holding the doctrine was a statutory one that 
could be overridden by Congress' later acts, and holding the doctrine 
was constitutional in nature. 
38. Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196, 198-9 (2d Cir. 1998).
39. Ass’n of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Mass. Dep’t of Envt’l Prot., 208 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.  2000). 
40. Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n, 152 F.3d at 198-199.
41. Id. at 198; Ass’n of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. 208 F.3d 1 at 3.
42. Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n, 152 F.3d at 200; Ass’n of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc., 208 F.3d at 7. 
43. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 235 (1845) (Catron, J. dissenting).
44. Neil M. Richards, The Supreme Court Justice and “Boring” Cases, 4 GREEN BAG
401, 402 (2001).  This lack of cachet is likely due to the doctrine’s primary use in dis-
putes over the ownership of submerged lands, coupled with receding public interest 
in control of waterways in an era of highways and the emergence of federalism as the 
primary basis for protecting powers of states. 
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Whether the equal footing doctrine renders the California pref-
erences in the CAA unconstitutional depends on whether the doc-
trine is a constitutional one in the first place.  Although the Supreme 
Court has consistently labeled it constitutional for some time now, 
because of the importance of the question to this paper's thesis, I 
will explain the doctrine's evolution through the Constitutional Con-
vention, adoption by the first Congress, evolution through Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, and then conclude with a summary of what is 
now broadly recognized as the basis and contours of the doctrine. 
A. The Constitutional Congress — The Debate, the Resolution,
and Its Implications
The Constitutional Congress of 1787 engaged in a serious de-
bate about whether later-admitted states should have the same pow-
ers as the original thirteen states.  The chief opponent of giving new 
states power equal to the first thirteen was Gouverneur Morris of 
Pennsylvania; he was joined in his vociferous opposition by Elbridge 
Gerry of Massachusetts.45 
Gerry spoke about the "dangers" posed by the Western states, 
and warned against putting the original states "in their hands.  They 
will, if they acquire power, like all men, abuse it.  They will oppress 
commerce and drain our wealth into the Western country."46  He 
moved to limit the number of new states to 12 or fewer, so they 
would not outnumber the original states, a motion which was sec-
onded by Rufus King of Massachusetts.47 
A strong voice in favor of equal footing for all states was Roger 
Sherman of Connecticut, supported by two Virginians, James Madi-
son and George Mason.48  Sherman spoke against Gerry's motion, ex-
pressing his view that there was "no probability that the number of 
future states will exceed that of the existing states," but arguing that 
since "our children and grandchildren . . . will be as likely to be citi-
zens of new Western States as of the old states . . . . [W]e ought to 
make no such discrimination as is proposed by the motion."49  The 
motion failed on a vote of five states to four.50 
However, the issue was far from settled, and soon a new pro-
posal came from Morris.  Morris argued that the Constitution should 
45. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 109
(Yale University Press 1913). 
46. WILLIAM PETERS, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION, 123 (Crown Publishers 1987). 
47. Id.
48. FARRAND, supra note 45, at 143.
49. PETERS, supra note 46, at  124.
50. Id.
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be structured to ensure the original states would dominate the na-
tional government.51  This proposition had precedents within the ex-
isting governmental system: several of the original states, including 
North and South Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, did not allow 
later-created counties in the western portion of those states to par-
ticipate equally in their state legislatures and assemblies.52 
Morris chaired the Convention's first committee responsible for 
apportionment of representatives from the existing and future states. 
In that role, with the help of Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts, 
Morris brought forth a proposal that was intended to give the original 
thirteen the power to "deal out the right of Representation in safe 
numbers to the Western States."53  This proposal was adopted by the 
Convention.54 
However, something curious happened when it came time to ac-
tually draft the language of the Constitutional provisions regarding 
the admission of states.  The Committee of Detail, consisting of sev-
eral of Morris' allies on the issue,55 emerged from their work with a 
provision that new states should be "admitted on the same terms 
with the original states."56  This was surprising on two counts: first, 
the Convention had adopted a proposal opposing such a position be-
fore the drafting committee began their work, second, most drafting 
committee members hailed from states that denied newer counties 
equal representation.  Max Farrand notes the Committee chose this 
language "either on their own responsibility or because they inter-
preted the views of the convention that way."57  Morris objected 
strenuously, on the grounds that such a measure would throw power 
into the hands of the newer states.58  Madison and others opposed 
him, but Morris' proposed language carried the day: "New States may 
be admitted by the Legislature into the Union."59 
51. Id. at 144. Specifically, Morris was adamant that Louisiana, if admitted to
the Union, should not be allowed a “voice in our councils.”  Eric Biber, The Price of Ad-
mission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions Imposed on States Entering the Union, 26 Am. 
J. Legal Hist. 119, 126 (2004) (citing historian William Dunning’s work).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 110.
54. Id.
55. The committee consisted of Gorham of Massachusetts, John Rutledge of
South Carolina, Edmund Randolph of Virginia, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, and 
Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut.  FARRAND, supra note 45, at 143. 
56. FARRAND, supra note 45, at 143.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 144; art. I, § 2, cl. 1; art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
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After the Louisiana Purchase, Morris was asked to explain this 
exact section of the Constitution, and did so in a letter to his friend 
Henry W. Livingston: 
Your inquiry . . . is substantially whether the Congress 
can admit, as a new State, territory, which did not belong 
to the United States when the Constitution was made.  In 
my opinion they can not. 
I always thought that, when we should acquire Canada 
and Louisiana, it would be proper to govern them as 
provinces, and allow them no voice in our councils.  In 
wording the third section of the fourth article, I went as 
far as circumstances would permit to establish the exclu-
sion.  Candor obliges me to add my belief, that, had it 
been more pointedly expressed, a strong opposition 
would have been made."60 
What implications does this history have for the equal footing 
jurisprudence?  As discussed below, although the Supreme Court 
now regularly recites the constitutional basis for the equal footing 
doctrine, at one time that was a hotly contested point.  If it is not a 
constitutional doctrine, and exists only in the statutory acts of ad-
mission or enabling acts, then may Congress override it — for in-
stance, by granting powers to California that the original 13 states do 
not have in the CAA?  The history offers something for either side of 
the legal debate, but about the founders' opinion on our current state 
of affairs, there is less doubt. 
For those who would argue the CAA is constitutional despite the 
equal footing doctrine, the best argument is that the founders explic-
itly rejected language allowing for such equal footing when they for-
mulated the Constitution.  In other words, the current Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that finds this doctrine is a constitutional one, sits un-
easily beside a history of the founders explicitly rejecting the inclu-
sion of such provisions.  If it were not a constitutional doctrine, then 
the equal footing doctrine would arise only from statutes regarding 
60. FARRAND, supra note 45, at 144.  With the advantage of hindsight, the foun-
ders’ ability to craft a union of states that still functions today is deeply impressive, 
especially because none of them envisioned anything close to the enormous expan-
sion the United States would experience in just 200 years.  Consider: Some deciding 
how to admit new states believed the number of new states would never number 
above 12; their opponents expected to acquire Canada, yet believed the new states 
would be uniformly poorer than the original states.  Although the current state of the 
Union is not in line with either vision, the fact that it stands as a true Union is taken 
for granted by nearly all its citizens and the world. 
 West  Northwest, Vol. 13, No. 1, Winter 2007 
132 
the admission of new states, and therefore, may be overridden by 
later Congressional action.61 
The compromise language finally adopted by the Convention 
has an evenness of treatment in other provisions that contradicts the 
professed aims of opponents of the "equal footing" language.  The 
representation in both houses of Congress does not depend on the 
date the state joined the Union.  As the author of the crucial sentence 
"New States may be admitted by the Legislature into the Union," 
Morris argued that it prohibited Congress from admitting any state 
formed from territory not owned by one of the states at the time of 
the Constitution's adoption, and required that they remain provinces. 
However, that interpretation is difficult to pull out of the sentence in 
question, and Morris alone appears to have managed it.  Even Morris 
admitted that many other founders would not have agreed with his 
interpretation, and the debates make it clear that a contentious issue 
was essentially resolved with compromise language that had as its 
chief asset room for ambiguity. 
What a majority, if not all, of the founders would have thought 
about a new state having powers denied to all the original states, 
however, is not ambiguous.  It is clear from their writings that even 
the founders who objected to the "equal footing" language would 
have objected more vociferously had they believed the Constitution 
allowed Congress to grant California powers while denying those 
same powers to original states like Massachusetts and New York. 
Therefore, there is little support that the founders believed this al-
lowed new states to have powers denied to the original states.  To the 
contrary, the history of the Convention shows that a provision disal-
lowing newer states powers denied to the original thirteen would 
have been quite popular. 
The CAA allocation of power was made by a Congress where rep-
resentatives and senators from new states far outnumbered those 
from the original states.  This would have been deeply disturbing to 
the founders, who feared domination by the "new" states over the 
founding states.  Congress, now dominated by "new" states, gave one 
of the new states governing power denied to all the founding states. 
Had the founders expected such an outcome, the tenor of the de-
bates makes it clear the Convention would have prevented it by alter-
ing the language regarding the relationship between the states.  In 
other words, even though the founders chose not to place the words 
"equal footing" in the Constitution, the proposal to do so would only 
have gained support if the founders had thought it possible that a 
61. Whether a state could legally exit the Union if significant terms of its ena-
bling act or act of admission were abrogated has never been seriously explored in a 
courtroom. 
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newer state like California would be granted powers that the original 
thirteen did not possess. 
B. Statutory Equal Footing
1. The Northwest Ordinance (Continental Congress)
In July of 1787, while the founders were debating whether to in-
sert the words "equal footing" into the Constitution, another govern-
ing body, the Continental Congress,62 was inserting it into law.  The 
phrase appeared first in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.63  Under a 
portion of the Ordinance to be "considered as articles of compact be-
tween the original states, and the people and States in the said terri-
tory, and forever remain unalterable unless by common consent," 
comes the language that territories should have the opportunity "for 
their admission to a share in the federal councils on an equal footing 
with the original States . . .  as early . . . as may be consistent with the 
general interest."64  Another "article of compact" provided that na-
tional debts would be paid "according to the same common rule or 
measure, by which apportionments thereof shall be made on the 
other States."65 
2. The First Congress
Very early in its first term, the first Congress voted to have the
Northwest Ordinance continue in full effect under the newly consti-
tuted government, reprinting it in full as part of the statutes at large 
of the United States.66  Curiously, however, when admitting new 
states, Congress did not immediately use the "equal footing" lan-
guage contained in the Ordinance, although statutes for admission of 
new states do contain comparable language.  The first state to be 
62. The First Continental Congress met from September 5, 1774, to October 26,
1774. The Second Continental Congress met from May 10, 1775, until the ratification of 
the Articles of Confederation on March 1, 1781. (The Revolutionary War officially con-
cluded in 1783.)  From 1781 until March 1, 1789 (when the U.S. Constitution went into 
effect), the nation’s legislative body was known as the Congress of the Confederation. 
This Article discusses primarily activities of the Congress of the Confederation, but oc-
casionally reaches back farther in history.  To reduce confusion, this Article refers to all 
of these pre-constitutional legislative bodies as the Continental Congress. 
63. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States
North-West of the River Ohio.  July 13, 1787, § 13. 
64. Id. art. V.
65. Id. art. IV.
66. Government of the North-West Territory, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50 (1789).  The
Northwest Ordinance received final House approval on July 21, 1789, Senate approval 
on August 4, 1789, and was signed into law by President George Washington on Au-
gust 7, 1789. 
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admitted after the adoption of the Constitution was Vermont, in 
March of 1791, followed by Kentucky, in1792.  Both statutes for Ver-
mont and Kentucky provide that the new states "shall be received and 
admitted into this Union, as a new and entire member of the United 
States of America."67  Congress also gave the new states two seats in 
the House of Representatives, pending the first census.68  Thus, al-
though they did not use the language of "equal footing," the amount 
of representation indicates that Congress understood the phrase 
"new and entire" to entitle member states to the same rights and 
treatment as the original states. 
3. Later Statehood Acts
The next state to join the Union was Tennessee, in 1796.  Con-
gress again avoided the words "equal footing" in the applicable legis-
lation, but expressed sentiments regarding Tennessee's status in 
much broader language: "in all other respects, as far as they be appli-
cable, the laws of the United States shall extend to, and have force in 
the state of Tennessee, in the same manner, as if that state had 
originally been one of the United States."69 
The Enabling Act of 1802,70 which admitted Ohio, is where "equal 
footing" and "same footing" reappeared front and center.71  The words 
"equal footing" appear in the subtitle of the Act ("the admission of 
such state in the Union, on an equal footing with the original 
States").72  The first section of the Act uses similar language, while 
67. Vermont Admission Act, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 191(1791); Kentucky Admission Act,
ch. 4,1 Stat. 189 (1791). 
68. Representatives from Congress from Kentucky and Vermont, ch. 9, 1 Stat.
191 (1791). 
69. Tennessee Admission Act, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 491 (1796).
70. Generally, the process of admitting states to the Union involves two major
pieces of federal legislation:  an “enabling act” and an “act of admission.” An ena-
bling act states the terms under which Congress would approve statehood.  E.g. Peo-
ple of the Territory of Indiana Authorized to Form A State Government, ch. 57, 3 Stat. 
289-291 (1816) (subtitled “An act to enable the people of the Indiana territory to form
a constitution and state government, and for the admission of such state into the
Union on an equal footing with the original states.”).  An act of admission is usually
much shorter, simply declaring that the state is admitted into the Union.  E.g. Indi-
ana Admission Act, 14 Pub. Res. 1, 3 Stat. 399 (1816).  There are, however, many ex-
ceptions to this rule: many states were admitted by only one piece of legislation,
others had multiple enabling or admission acts.  Several states were admitted by
presidential proclamation , some of which have been memorialized in the United
States Statutes at Large.  E.g. Nebraska Admission Proclamation, 14 Stat 82-21 No. 9
(1867), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=72078.
71. Ohio Admission Act, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 173 (1802), modified as to real estate
grants in ch. 21, 2 Stat. 225-27 (1803). 
72. Id.
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echoing language from the Tennessee Act of Admission: "said state, 
when formed, shall be admitted into the Union, upon the same foot-
ing with the original states, in all respects whatever."73 
From 1802 forward, the words "equal footing" or "same footing" 
appeared in the title or statute of all other enabling acts and acts of 
admission; every state admitted to the Union has explicitly entered 
on such footing.74  In addition, Mississippi's Admission Act of 1817 
contained a direct reference to the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, not-
ing that admission of the state on "equal footing with the original 
states in all respects whatever" was pursuant to the terms of the Or-
73. Id.
74. In order of eventual admission of the states: Louisiana Enabling Act, ch. 23, 2
Stat 322-23 § 7 (1805) (“upon the footing of the original states”); Louisiana Admission Act, 
ch. 50, 2 Stat. 701-04 § 1 (1811) (supplemented as to courts and abolishing local govern-
ment, ch. 93, 2 Stat. 743 (1812)); Indiana Enabling Act, ch. 57, 3 Stat 289-91 (1816); Indiana 
Admission Act, 14 Pub. Res. 1, 3 Stat. 399-400 (1816) ; Mississippi Enabling Act,  ch. 23, 3 
Stat 348-49 § 1;  Mississippi Admission Act, 15 Pub. Res. 1, 3 Stat. 472-73 (1817); Illinois 
Enabling Act, ch. 67, 3 Stat. 428-31 §§ 1, 4 (1818); Illinois Admission Act, 15 Pub. Res. 1, 3 
Stat. 536  (1818); Alabama Enabling Act, ch. 47, 3 Stat. 489-92 § 1 (1819); Alabama Admis-
sion Act, 16 Pub. Res. 1, 3 Stat. 608 (1819); Maine Admission Act, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 544 (1820); 
Missouri Enabling Act, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545-48 § 1 (1820); Missouri Admission Act, 16 Pub. Res. 
1, 3 Stat. 645 (1821); Missouri Admission Proclamation, 3 Stat. 797 (1821); Arkansas Ena-
bling Act, ch. 100, 5 Stat. 50- § 1(1836)  (as supplemented by ch. 120, 5 Stat. 58-59 (1836) and 
with changes assented to in ch. 68, 9 Stat. 42  (1846) and ch. 54, 30 Stat. 262 (1898)); Arkan-
sas Admission Act, ch. 100,. 5 Stat. 50-51  (1836); Michigan Enabling Act, ch. 99, 5 Stat. 49-50 
§§ 2, 4 (1836) (as supplemented by ch. 121, 5 Stat. 59-60 (1836)); Florida and Iowa Admis-
sion Act,  ch. 28, 5 Stat. 742-43 §§ 1, 4 (1845) (as supplemented by ch. 75, 5 Stat. 788 (1845)
and ch. 76, 5 Stat. 789-90 (1845) and as amended by ch. 123, 9 Stat. 410-12 (1849); Texas
Admission Act, 29 Pub. Res. 1, 9 Stat. 108 §1 (1845); Wisconsin Enabling Act, ch. 89, 9 Stat.
56-58  § 1 (1846); Wisconsin Admission Act I, ch. 53, 9 Stat. 178-79 §§ 1, 4 (1847); Wisconsin 
Admission Act II, ch. 50, 9 Stat. 233-35 § 1(1848); California Admission Act, ch. 50, 9 Stat.
452-53 § 1(1850); Minnesota Enabling Act, ch. 60, 11 Stat. 166-67 § 1(1857); Minnesota Ad-
mission Act, ch. 31, 11 Stat. 285  §1 (1858)  (as supplemented by ch. 74, 11 Stat. 402 (1859);
Oregon Admission Act, ch. 33, 11 Stat. 383-84 § 1 (1859) (as amended by ch. 2, 12 Stat.
(1860); Kansas Admission on Condition Act, ch. 26, 11 Stat. 269-72 § 1 (1858); ch. 20, 12 Stat. 
126-28  § 1 (1861); West Virginia Admission Act, ch. 6, 12 Stat. 633-34  § 1 (1862); Nevada
Enabling Act, ch. 36, 13 Stat. 30-32 § 1 (1864)  (as amended by ch. 94,  13 Stat. 85(1864));
Nebraska Enabling Act, ch. 59, 13 Stat. 47-50 (1864)  (“equal footing” in title only); Nebraska 
Admission Act, ch. 36, 14 Stat. 391-92 §1 (1867); Nebraska Admission Proclamation, 14 Stat. 
82-21 No. 9 (1867) ; Colorado Enabling Act I, ch. 37,13 Stat. 32-25 § 1 (1864)  (as amended by 
ch. 135, 13 Stat. 137 (1864)); Colorado Enabling Act, II, ch. 139, 18 Stat. 474-76  § 1 (1875) (as 
amended by ch. 17, 19 Stat. 5-6 (1876)); North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana and Wash-
ington Enabling Act, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676 (1889) (as amended by ch. 256, 29 Stat. 189 (1896), 
ch. 172, 47 Stat. 150-51 (1932), Pub. L. No. 85-6, 71 Stat. 5 (1957), and Pub. L. 91-463, 84 Stat. 
987 (1970)); Idaho Admission Act, ch. 656, 26 Stat. 215-19 § 1 (1890); Wyoming Admission
Act, ch. 664, 26 Stat. 222 (1890)); Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138, 28 Stat. 107 §§ 1, 4 (1894); Proc-
lamation Declaring Utah Statehood, 6 Thorpe 3700  (January 4, 1896);  Oklahoma, New Mex-
ico, and Arizona Enabling Act, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267, Title and § 26 (1906) (as amended by
ch. 2911, 34 Stat. 1286 (1907)); Alaska Statehood Bill, Pub. L. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 § 1 (1958);
Hawaii Admissions Act, Pub. L. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 § 1 (1959). 
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dinance.75  Those terms were also referenced in several other state-
hood Acts.76 
C. Equal Footing in the Supreme Court
The majority of Supreme Court cases dealing with the equal
footing doctrine has been about the title to lands, especially sub-
merged lands.  The doctrine has played a key role, however, in some 
of the biggest issues of the United States' political history: decisions 
regarding the federal and state government relationship to American 
Indian tribes, the slavery debate, the spread of religious freedom, and 
most of all, the relationship between the federal government and that 
of the states.  Although it wasn't until the 1840s that the Court would 
declare the doctrine had a constitutional as well as a statutory basis, 
the Court has been remarkably consistent in describing the major 
role the equal footing doctrine has played in the nation's political 
structure.  In addition, the Court has always seen the heart of the 
doctrine as a protection of political rights, and guarded any perceived 
encroachment on political rights more carefully than state claims to 
land under the doctrine.  Below, I discuss how the Supreme Court's 
equal footing jurisprudence has evolved over time. 
1. Pre-Civil War: Land, Corpses, and Slavery
The first Supreme Court discussion of equal footing doctrine, in
1831, came from a concurrence.77  Justice Baldwin noted that every 
state which had given up land to the federal government had condi-
tioned that cession on admission to the Union on "an equal footing 
with the original states."78  Citing the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 
he found the intention to form "new, free, sovereign and independent 
states" to be the "clear meaning and understanding of all the ceding 
states, and of congress, in accepting the cession of their western 
lands up to the time of the adoption of the constitution."79  Justice 
Baldwin cited the Tenth Amendment to support that states had an 
unimpaired right to individual sovereignty, in that the municipal 
regulations of one would not have any legal effect on those of an-
other, and stated more generally that the Constitution "recognized" 
the sovereignty of an individual state.80 
75. 15 Pub. Res. 1, 3 Stat. 473 (1817).
76. E.g., Illinois Enabling Act, ch. 67, 3 Stat. 428-30 § 4 (1818).
77. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia., 30 U.S. 1, 31 (1831).
78. Id. at 35 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 47-48.
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The first majority opinion of the Court discussing the equal foot-
ing doctrine came four years later, in Mayor of New Orleans v. De Armas.81  
It was swiftly followed by a second opinion, which also grappled with 
the difficulties of sorting out Louisiana's complex legal history.82  In 
the first case, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, decided 
which of two claimants to a parcel of land had the better title: the pe-
titioners, who traced their title back to a Spanish grant, or the City of 
New Orleans, which claimed land rights under French law and there-
fore the treaty providing for the Louisiana Purchase.83  Marshall found 
that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the question, specifically 
holding that the Act admitting Louisiana as a state "on an equal foot-
ing with the original states in all aspects whatever" could not be read 
to give jurisdiction over the dispute.84  Marshall noted that jurisdic-
tion might exist under such a provision, however, if New Orleans ar-
gued the United States had claimed land that rightfully belonged to 
the State of Louisiana.85 
Given the Court's opinion of 1835, it is unsurprising that the 
1836 case involved New Orleans' contention that the United States 
had claimed land that rightfully belonged the City of New Orleans, via 
the State of Louisiana.86  The Court stated that the rights of Louisiana 
were the same as the original states, since she was admitted to the 
union "on the same footing."87  On that basis, the Court found the 
federal government could not claim the disputed property.88 The court 
did not state whether the equal footing precedent that decided the 
case came from the admittance statute or the Constitution. 
In 1840, the Supreme Court once again considered how the 
equal footing doctrine played into the tangled legal history of Louisi-
ana.89  In Lessee of Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe,90 Justice Baldwin, who opined 
many times about Louisiana property disputes, wrote a concurring 
opinion citing the Constitution, the Northwest Ordinance, and the 
"general course of legislation by Congress, in relation to the govern-
ment and property in the disputed territory."91  He concluded that the 
81. Mayor of New Orleans v. De Armas, 34 U.S. 224, 235 (1835).
82. New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662 (1836).
83. New Orleans v. De Armas, 34 U.S. at 225-26.
84. Id. at 235.
85. Id. at 236.
86. New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662, 662 (1836).
87. Id. at 737.
88. Id.
89. Had Gouverneur Morris lived to see 1840, he might have pointed out that
his idea to rule Louisiana as a province would have cut down on litigation. 
90. 39 U.S. 353 (1840).
91. Id. at 369-371.
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property in Louisiana was subject to the same laws as if the property 
had lain in another state.92  Justice Baldwin stated that the equal foot-
ing of Louisiana was established when Congress passed Louisiana's 
Enabling Act, in 1805, thus extending the principles of the Northwest 
Ordinance.93  He then compared the right to equal footing along with 
the rights to trial by jury and habeas corpus, among others.94 
Two years later, another concurring opinion mentioned the 
equal footing doctrine, in a case involving title to land subject to dif-
ferent crowns; this time, the land in question was in Alabama.95  In 
Mobile v. Eslava, Justice Catron explained the Court was aware that the 
Supreme Court of Alabama had reasoned because the original states 
had title to the submerged lands of their states, the equal footing 
doctrine would be violated if Alabama were not given the same title.96  
The majority affirmed the lower decision without reference to the 
equal footing doctrine, deciding the question on statutory interpreta-
tion alone.97  But Justice Catron interpreted the doctrine, writing: 
The stipulation in the ordinance of 1787, and which is re-
peated in the resolution admitting Alabama, guarantying 
[sic] to the new state equal rights with the old, referred to 
the political rights and sovereign capacities left to the 
old states, unimpaired by the constitution of the United 
States; and which were confirmed to them by that in-
strument.  New states have] equal capacities of self-
government with the old states, and equal benefits under 
the Constitution of the United States.  This is the extent 
of the guarantee.  That each and all of the states have 
sovereign power over their navigable waters, above and 
below the tide, no one doubts.98 
This spirited defense of equal footing has interesting implica-
tions First, although the concurrence refers explicitly to statutes, it 
implies a constitutional basis for the doctrine ("equal benefits under 
the Constitution").  Second, it makes clear that ownership of land is a 
relatively minor piece of the doctrine; at heart, the doctrine promises 
equality of political rights to all states. 
92. Id. at 421.
93. Id. at 373.
94. Id. at 374.
95. Mobile v. Eslava, 41 U.S. 234 (1842).
96. Id. at 253.
97. Id. at 247.
98. Id. at 258-259.
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In 1845, two cases on the Court's docket dealt with the equal 
footing doctrine, and the first explicit arguments that the doctrine 
was constitutional appeared.  Despite Justice Catron's focus on po-
litical rights, the next time the Justices took up the topic, 99 it was yet 
another submerged lands case out of Alabama.100  However, the Court 
did not limit the opinion to land issues.  Writing for the Court, Justice 
McKinley cited the Northwest Ordinance, and for the first time, ex-
pressed a specific constitutional basis for the doctrine.101  After quot-
ing Article IV, Section 3, which governs the admission of new states, 
he stated, "When Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal 
footing with the original states, she succeeded to all the rights of 
sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain."102  The Court clarified 
that the doctrine was a constitutional and not merely a statutory one, 
finding in dicta that even if there had been an express stipulation of 
the rights of sovereignty or eminent domain, such a stipulation 
would have been "void and inoperative[,] because the United States 
ha[s] no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction 
[or] sovereignty" over objections by a state.103  "The right of Alabama 
and every other new state to exercise all the powers of government, 
which belong to and may be exercised by the original states of the 
union, must be admitted, and remain unquestioned."104  The Court 
held that the only regulations Congress could impose on a new state, 
were those that it could also impose on the original states.105  The 
same reasoning also meant that a new State's power "does not . . . 
exceed the power thereby conceded to Congress over the original 
states on the same subject."106 
99. Although a party cited the equal footing doctrine in his argument in an
1844 case, no member of the Court took up the topic again until 1845.  Gaines v. Chew, 
43 U.S. 619, 639 (1844). 
100. Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845).  Interestingly, this case is often
seen as a weakening of the equal footing doctrine, in that it found Congress could 
award public lands to third parties before statehood, defeating the argument that the 
equal footing doctrine required Congress to not dispose of public lands so that they 
would devolve to the state upon admission.  E.g., Utah Division of State Lands v. United 
States, 482 U.S. 193, 196 (1987).  The firm constitutional basis for the doctrine articu-
lated in the case, however, strengthened the foundation for the core of the doctrine, 
even while declaring a new boundary.  The Court explicitly declined to overrule Pol-
lard’s Lessee v. Hagan in Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. 471 (1850). 
101. 44 U.S. at 222-23.
102. Id. at 223 (specifically, the same rights as granted to the state of Georgia
on admission)  Id. 
103. Id.
104. Id. at 224.
105. Id. at 229.
106. Id. at 230.
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Although Justice Catron dissented in this case, he objected not 
to the grounding of the doctrine in the Constitution or even the 
broad statements about the scope of permissible regulation by Con-
gress, but to the doctrine's application to submerged land title.  He 
argued that "no state complains, nor has any one ever complained, of 
the infraction of her political and sovereign rights by the United 
States," and that the case was really one regarding a right of prop-
erty.107  He also argued that the United States was being denied rights 
given to private landowners: "the United States did not part with the 
right of soil by enabling a state to assume political jurisdiction."108  
He closed his dissent by noting that he had chosen to write "because 
this is deemed the most important controversy every brought before 
this [C]ourt, either as it respects the amount of property involved, or 
the principles on which the present judgment proceeds."109  In other 
words, the principles as to the political rights of states were not, in 
his view, in dispute; the specific application to the title of submerged 
lands was the application of the doctrine with which he took issue. 
The second case of the term, Permoli v. New Orleans, was unques-
tionably about political rights.110  The City of New Orleans had passed 
a statute fining Catholic priests who displayed corpses during funer-
als in their churches, requiring that open-casket services be held in a 
specific chapel.  Reverend Bernard Permoli violated the statute and 
was fined accordingly.  Noting that "the Constitution makes no provi-
sion for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their reli-
gious liberties" but that the state's enabling act required Louisiana to 
protect those rights as a condition of statehood, the Court resolved 
the conflict.111 
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Catron, the Court 
found it was proper for Congress to announce the terms under which 
it would accept a statehood petition, and that Congress could choose 
to reject as or accept such a petition as a whole, taking into account 
whether the "proper principles" were reflected in the proposed state 
constitution.112  If Congress admitted a state, then it was precluded 
from going back to alter the state's constitution to comply with the 
enabling act.113  The Court rejected that provisions of the Northwest 
107. Id. at 232.
108. Id. at 234.
109. Id. at 235.
110. Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845).
111. Id. at 609.  The U.S. Constitution did not require state governments to
protect religious freedom until the Supreme Court “incorporated” this provision of 
the First Amendment in 1940.  See Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
112. Id.
113. Id. at 610.
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Ordinance protecting religious liberty applied following statehood, or 
indeed that any territorial guarantees survived statehood, absent an 
explicit statement.114  Since the only guarantee of religious liberty was 
therefore found in the state's constitution, the question of whether 
the ordinance violated the state's constitution was a matter of state, 
not federal, law, "equally so in the old states and the new ones."115 
The reference to the old states is best understood this way: if 
the enabling acts created requirements for new states, then all legis-
lation from those states that might violate the state constitution 
would also raise a question of federal law under the enabling act. 
The original 13 states had no enabling acts, and therefore, they would 
never grapple with a question of federal law arising from state consti-
tutional violations.  The Court found that violated the equal footing 
doctrine, and therefore, held it lacked jurisdiction the enabling act 
ceased to have an effect once the state was admitted.  The Court 
therefore reasoned it had no jurisdiction.116 
The next opinion to discuss the equal footing doctrine in any 
depth was the notorious Dred Scott case.117  Although the doctrine did 
not become the heart of the decision, the Permoli decision had made 
future compromises problematic; the Court invalidated the Missouri 
Compromise on the basis that Congress could not prohibit slavery in 
the territories.118.  Justice Nelson's concurring opinion may best illus-
trate the wrench that Permoli threw into the slavery debate: "[I]t be-
longs to the sovereign state of Missouri to determine by her laws the 
question of slavery within her jurisdiction, subject only to such limi-
tations as may be found in the Federal Constitution.. . . This is the 
necessary result of the independent and sovereign character of the 
State."119  In other words, even if the Enabling Acts or Acts of Admis-
sion of a state specified that it should enter the Union as a slave or 
free state, there would be no legal recourse if, for instance, a state 
that had entered as a slave state then outlawed slavery. 
2. The Equal Footing Doctrine Splits: Political vs. Property Rights
Between the Civil War and 1895, the Court took only four cases
that mentioned the equal footing doctrine, and all dealt with title to 
submerged lands.  Other than affirming in strong language that the 
equal footing doctrine was "settled" law with both a statutory and 
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
118. Id. at 438-39, 446-47.
119. Id. at 460-461.
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constitutional basis, the cases were unremarkable.120  In 1896, the 
Court, in the first of many cases to do so, decided a title dispute with 
an American Indian tribe in which it weighed treaty language against 
the land title the State claimed as a result of the equal footing doc-
trine.121  The case continued the trend of increasing stress on the con-
stitutionality and broad nature of the principle of equal footing, 
stating that Wyoming was "endowed with powers and attributes 
equal in scope to those enjoyed by the States already admitted"122 
and that the recognition of equal rights was "merely declaratory of 
the general rule."123 
The new century brought some new facets to the equal footing 
doctrine, as the Court took the opportunity to delineate between two 
branches of the doctrine: the branch dealing with property rights, and 
the branch dealing with political rights.  Stearns v. Minnesota involved a 
challenge to a Minnesota law that gave a railroad company a special 
break on taxation of lands previously given by the federal government 
to the State at the time of admission.124  The Court explained that 
"different considerations may underlie the question as to the validity" 
of compacts between the state and the federal government regarding 
"political rights and obligations" and those compacts that dealt only 
with property.125  The Court continued, "It has often been said that a 
State admitted into the Union enters therein in full equality with all 
the others, and such equality may forbid any agreement or compact 
limiting or qualifying political rights and obligations."126  Finding that 
property provisions did not truly involve a question of equality, the 
Court held that the State could be required to live up to the obliga-
tions of a trust that the federal government imposed as a condition of 
the land cession.127 
120. E.g., Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. 423, 436 (1867) (equal footing doctrine
as settled law); Escanaba & Lake Mich. Transp. Co. v.  Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1883) 
(“[Illinois] was admitted, and could be admitted, only on the same footing with the 
[original states.”); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 434 (1892) (“[T]he equality 
prescribed would have existed if it had not been thus stipulated”); Shively v. Bowlby, 
152 U.S. 1, 34 (1894) (“Could such an intention be ascribed to Congress, the right to 
enforce it may be confidently denied.  Clearly, Congress could exact of the new state 
the surrender of no attribute inherent in her character as a sovereign, independent 
state, or indispensable to her equality with her sister states, necessarily implied and 
guaranteed by the very nature of the federal compact.”). 
121. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
122. Id. at 514.
123. Id. at 511.
124. Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223 (1900).
125. Id. at 244-45.
126. Id. at 245.
127. Id. at 253.
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The Court's reaffirmance of the importance and centrality of the 
doctrine's political implications, while recognizing but downplaying 
the property implications, was an obvious outgrowth of the jurispru-
dence as a whole, going back as far as Justice Catron's concurrence in 
1842.128  Stearns did mark an important doctrinal step, in that the 
Court declined to extend Permoli.  Recall that in the Permoli decision, 
the Court unanimously rejected that federal courts could reconsider 
state Supreme Courts decisions interpreting  state constitutions sim-
ply because the enabling act of a state required certain elements in 
that constitution.  The rationale was there could never be a federal 
cause of action for the original thirteen states in the same situation, 
as they lacked an enabling act, and therefore, it would be a violation 
of the equal footing doctrine to subject the newer states to federal 
court oversight.  In Stearns, however, the Court made no such argu-
ment considering property.  Arguably, because the original thirteen 
states had not received their public lands from Congress, none of 
their public lands would have the same limitations.129  The Court 
might have found, therefore, that subjecting those lands held pub-
licly by newer states to extra obligations violated the equal footing 
doctrine.  Instead, the Court chose to put property rights stemming 
from the equal footing doctrine on a lesser plane than political rights 
from the same source.  Reading Permoli and Stearns together, the two 
decisions create a dualism political rights and land rights under the 
equal footing doctrine that remains to this day. 
3. Fleshing Out the Political Branch of the Equal Footing
Doctrine
After Stearns, the Court waited 11 years before addressing the 
equal footing doctrine again, but resumed discussions with the most 
important case regarding the political branch of the equal footing 
doctrine that has been written.  Coyle v. Smith posed the question of 
whether Oklahoma was permitted to move its state capital from 
Guthrie to Oklahoma City.130  Although any schoolchild who has been 
made to memorize the state capitals knows the state was allowed to 
do so, few know why. 
128. Mobile v. Eslava, 41 U.S. 234 (1842).
129. Justice White’s concurrence, which was signed by Justices Harlan, Gray
and McKenna, makes this particularly clear, as it assumes that the Minnesota Su-
preme Court erred in deciding that the taxation system was not in violation of the 
state Constitution.  Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. at 257.  White then poses the ques-
tion “[Can Congress] confer upon a state legislature the right to violate the Constitu-
tion of the state?” and determines the answer, at least in this case, is “No.”  Id. 
130. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
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Oklahoma's Enabling Act required that the capital of the state 
should remain Guthrie until at least 1913, and then could be moved 
only if the move was ratified by a popular election.131  Oklahoma be-
came a state in 1907, and in 1910, the state legislature passed a law 
to erect the necessary buildings in Oklahoma City and to move the 
capital.132  The plaintiff, Coyle, owned a great deal of land in Guthrie, 
and brought suit alleging that the move violated the state constitu-
tion and federal law.133  The Oklahoma Supreme Court found no viola-
tion, and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review that decision. 
What it took up was the question of whether there was a violation of 
federal law. 
Holding that "the power to locate its own seat of government, 
and to determine when and how it shall be changed from one place 
to another, and to appropriate its own public funds for that purpose, 
are essentially and peculiarly state powers," the Court also noted that 
the idea of a federal mandate to move a state capital in one of the 
original thirteen states "would not be for a moment entertained."134  
With that preamble, the Court set out to decide the question it 
framed: "Can a state be placed upon a plane of inequality with its sis-
ter states in the Union if the Congress chooses to impose conditions 
which so operate, at the time of its admission?"135 
The Court first turned to the provisions of the Constitution deal-
ing with the admission of states.  It read those powers to have an in-
herent limitation, namely the lack of power to "admit political 
organizations which are less or greater, or different in dignity or 
power, from those political entities which constitute the Union."136  It 
then looked to the statutory basis of the equal footing doctrine, not-
ing that all the acts admitting new states into the Union had recog-
nized their equality with the previous states in terms that were, at a 
minimum, "emphatic and significant."137 
"This Union" was and is a union of states, equal in power, 
dignity, and authority, each competent to exert that re-
siduum of sovereignty not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution itself.  To maintain otherwise would 
be to say that the Union, through the power of Congress 
to admit new sates, might come to be a union of states 
131. Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267 (1906).
132. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. at 563-64.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 565.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 566.
137. Id.
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unequal in power, as including states whose powers were 
restricted only by the Constitution, with others whose 
powers had been further restricted by an act of 
Congress . . . . The argument that Congress derives from 
the duty of "guaranteeing to each state in this Union a 
republican form of government" power to impose restric-
tions upon a new state which deprive it of equality with 
other members of the Union, has no merit.138 
With this background, the Court distinguished three types of 
provisions that might be found in enabling acts: those that are ful-
filled upon the admission of the state, those that are intended to op-
erate in the future and are within the scope of the powers of Congress 
over the subject, and those that operate in the future and restrict the 
powers of a state in respect to matters which would otherwise be ex-
clusively within the sphere of state power.139  Citing Permoli, the Court 
found the first set of provisions were constitutional, in that Congress 
could require certain provisions in a state constitution before admit-
ting that state, but that upon admission, these provisions would be 
"subject to alteration and amendment" just as any other part of the 
state's constitution would be.140  The Court closed discussion of the 
first provision by saying, "there is to be found no sanction for the 
contention that any state may be deprived of any of the power consti-
tutionally possessed by other States, as States, by reason of the 
terms on which the acts admitting them to the Union have been 
framed."141 
The Court then turned to provisions intended to reach future ac-
tions that were within or outside the scope of the powers of Con-
gress.  The Court found that provisions that exceeded the scope of 
Congress over the subject were void, because the state's powers 
could not be "constitutionally diminished, impaired, or shorn away 
by any conditions, compacts, or stipulations . . . which would not be 
valid and effectual if the subject of congressional legislation after 
admission."142  In contrast, those conditions which could have been 
made part of a statute would be enforceable, because the conditions 
138. Id. at 567.  The Court tempered this language by stating that Congress
may have the duty to make sure that the form of government is not changed to one 
that is anti-republican, citing Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162 (1874).  Coyle v. Smith, 
221 U.S. at 567-68. 
139. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. at 568.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 570.
142. Id. at 573.
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were independently valid, passed by Congress within its authority.143  
The Court found that the question of the capital's location was obvi-
ously beyond Congress' authority to dictate through legislation, and 
hence, was unconstitutional.144  The Court closed: 
[T]he constitutional equality of the states is essential to
the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the
Republic was organized.  When that equality disappears
we may remain a free people, but the union will not be
the Union of the Constitution.145
Coyle remains both the most recent case to discuss the political 
rights of states under the equal footing doctrine and the case offering 
the best explication of the doctrine.146  Although the case was osten-
sibly about the limitations in enabling acts that could be given 
weight, the Court's language was much more wide-ranging, conclud-
ing that  equality of states forms an essential foundation of the coun-
try.  Coyle also created a method for handling challenges to 
conditions in enabling acts: determine whether Congress could have 
enacted the condition under other statutory powers, and if so, the 
condition may be enforced.  The Court did not, however, address the 
potential problem this method creates; namely, the question of 
whether Congress can pass a law that impacts only one state. 
In the modern era, the best explication of the status of the equal 
footing doctrine came in 1950, in United States v. Texas.147  Citing Stearns, 
the Court noted the long jurisprudence of equal political rights and 
sovereignty required by the equal footing doctrine.148  The Court sepa-
rately discussed the effect the doctrine has on property ownership, 
noting that the Court had consistently held that to deny the later-
admitted states ownership of submerged lands would deny them 
equal footing, "since the original States did not grant these proper-
ties to the United States but reserved them to themselves."149  The 
Court also noted some matters that were outside the boundaries of 
the clause: 
143. Id. at 574.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 580.
146. In 1918, in a case that spent little time on the equal footing doctrine, the
Court would label the ideal that states have equal local governmental power a “tru-
ism” in deciding that the federal government had the power to enforce interstate 
compacts approved by Congress.  Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 593 (1918). 
147. 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
148. Id. at 716.
149. Id.
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It does not, of course, include economic stature or stand-
ing. There has never been equality among the States in 
that sense.  Some States when they entered the Union 
had within their boundaries tracts of land belonging to 
the Federal Government; others were sovereigns of their 
soil.  Some had special agreements with the Federal 
Government governing property within their borders. 
Area, location, geology, and latitude have created great 
diversity in the economic aspects of the several States. 
The requirement of equal footing was designed not to 
wipe out those diversities but to create parity as respects 
political standing and sovereignty.150 
4. Modern Supreme Court Cases: Submerged into the
Submerged Lands Cases
Since the 1950s, no major equal footing case has dealt with po-
litical rights or even discussed them.  Instead, the doctrine has been 
used nearly exclusively in cases deciding property issues regarding 
submerged lands, with resulting forays into American Indian law and 
water law.  Little more than a sentence or two is devoted to the equal 
footing doctrine in these cases, usually a simple statement about the 
nature of the doctrine before diving into factual issues that bear upon 
a particular application.151 
The exception came with two cases from the 1970s, when the 
Court set forth a new principle as part of the equal footing doctrine, 
and then repealed it soon afterward.  The question on was whether 
the equal footing doctrine mandated the application of federal com-
mon law over the laws of a state.  In Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, the 
Court decided whether the ownership of previously submerged lands 
divested from the State after the waters had been removed.  The 
Court held that the equal footing doctrine did not entitle the state to 
the deed to those lands, because there was no longer "a public bene-
150. Id. (citation omitted).
151. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 80 S. Ct. 33, 37 (1959); California v. United
States, 438 U.S. 645, 648,  654 (1978); California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 60 (1979); Mon-
tana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981); California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. 
United States, 457 U.S. 273, 281, 285 (1982); Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands 
Comm’n, 466 U.S. 198, 205 (1984) (“The Federal Government, of course, cannot dis-
pose of a right possessed by the State under the equal-footing doctrine of the United 
States Constitution”); United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 706 (1987); 
Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195197 (1987); Phillips Petroleum Co. 
v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 472 (1988); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,
526 U.S. 172, 203-204 (1998); Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 280 (2001).
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fit to be protected."152  However, the Court determined that the State's 
unsuccessful invocation of the equal footing doctrine meant that the 
Court had to use federal common law to resolve the dispute.153 
In 1977, the Court explicitly overruled Bonelli, teaching that the 
equal footing doctrine's effect on land ownership occurs at admission 
only; after that time, "the force of that doctrine was spent," and it was 
not a basis on which federal common law could be applied to over-
rule the decisions of a state.154  The Court noted that "precisely the 
contrary is true," stating that precedent made it clear the doctrine re-
sults in a State taking title, notwithstanding post-statehood efforts of 
the federal government to grant that title to others.155  The reasoning 
of the Court's opinion harkened back to Permoli, noting that to decide 
that the equal footing doctrine allowed federal common law to be 
applied: 
would result in a perverse application of the equal-
footing doctrine.  An original State would be free to 
choose its own legal principles to resolve property dis-
putes relating to land under its riverbeds; a subsequently 
admitted State would be constrained by the equal-
footing doctrine to apply the federal common-law rule, 
which may result in property law determinations anti-
thetical to the desires of that State.156 
The Court finished with an added justification for overruling its 
decision of just a few years earlier, saying that the case raised "an is-
sue substantially related to the constitutional sovereignty of states," 
and therefore, "considerations of stare decisis play a less important role 
than they do in cases involving substantive property law."157 
D. Modern Attempts to Revivify the Equal Footing Doctrine
Though the Supreme Court has not decided any cases dealing
with political rights in modern times, the Circuit courts have.  In par-
ticular, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have considered attempts by a 
wide range of litigants to revivify the political branch of the equal 
footing doctrine.  Although unsuccessful, anti-nuclear activists, po-
lygamists, and sagebrush rebels have all attempted to use the doc-
152. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 323 (1973).
153. Id. at 330 n.27.
154. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 371 (1977). 
155. Id.
156. Id. at 378.
157. Id. at 381.
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trine.  The first two groups are primarily concerned with the political 
arm of the equal footing doctrine; the Sagebrush Rebellion has fo-
cused on the property aspects.  As discussed below, although their 
attempts failed, the courts have continued, sometimes in dicta, to re-
affirm the power of the equal footing doctrine. 
1. Nuclear Waste and the Equal Footing Doctrine
The Department of Energy set its sights on putting the nation's
first long-term geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-
level radioactive waste in Nevada, at a site called Yucca Mountain.  In 
Nevada v. Watkins, the State of Nevada challenged Congressional au-
thority to designate Yucca Mountain, which is federal property, as the 
sole site for possible development of the repository.158  Among other 
theories, the State raised the argument that the equal footing doc-
trine prevented Congress from selecting a single state as the nuclear 
waste repository for the country absent that state's consent, because 
to do so would make her unequal to her sister states.159 
In a discussion  that did not consider whether this question fell 
within the property arm of the doctrine or the political arm, the Court 
ruled that because the passing of title of submerged lands to the 
States had not prevented the federal government from continuing to 
pass laws impacting navigation, the fact that the federal government 
did own Yucca Mountain meant that there was no restriction on Con-
gress' power to enact regulations concerning the national nuclear 
waste repository pursuant to the Property Clause.160  Although the 
opinion included a quote from Coyle v. Oklahoma, the opinion other-
wise lacked any indication of the elevated position of the political 
rights equal footing doctrine over the property rights equal footing 
doctrine.  Instead, the Court used the property rights side of the ju-
risprudence to decide an arguably political question relying on fairly 
weak grounds from a doctrinal standpoint.161 
2. Polygamy and the Equal Footing Doctrine
In the 1980s, a policeman terminated for practicing plural mar-
riage sued various state and local officials, arguing that Utah's Ena-
158. Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1990).
159. Id. at 1554.
160. Id. at 1555.
161. The opinion did quote United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950), re-
garding the impossibility of the states being equal in, among other things, geology. 
The best argument for upholding the court’s decision is that the Ninth Circuit implic-
itly found the placing of a nuclear waste depository in Nevada to involve an inequal-
ity of rock formations rather than of political rights.  As the opinion did not support 
that argument, however, its strength is limited. 
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bling Act, which prohibited polygamy, violated the equal footing doc-
trine.162  Essentially, the plaintiff hoped to prove that Utah had been 
forced to adopt this law as a condition of admission,163 and that re-
quirement unconstitutionally restricted Utah's legislating powers. 
The Tenth Circuit, however, argued that there was no need to reach 
this question, although it provided a lengthy footnote regarding Coyle 
v. Smith, the case addressing the location of Oklahoma's capital.164  In
an analysis that touched on questions of redressability, the court
noted that since statehood, Utah had never attempted to change
those portions of state statutes and the state Constitution that pro-
hibited polygamy.165  Noting that it was "settled public policy" that it
would be in Utah's power to enact such a prohibition, the court found
the claim lacked merit, because of a lack of evidence that the state
government would repeal the law but for the federal mandate.166
3. Sagebrush Rebellion
Attempts to expand the property branch of the equal footing ju-
risprudence have come largely from the group of Western activists 
known as the "sagebrush rebellion."  Ranchers accused of allowing 
their animals to graze on federal lands without authorization raised 
the clause as a defense in the late 1990s.167  The ranchers argued that 
the national forest lands were not properly held by the United States, 
because the equal footing doctrine required all public lands to be 
turned over to the State of Nevada upon its admission.168  Finding 
that the Property Clause meant Congress would not be required to 
divest itself from title, regardless of the equal footing doctrine, the 
court held that the federal government had the right to hold that 
property upon Nevada's admission.169 
162. Potter v. Murray City., 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1985).
163. Although the court did not need to address it, there is a great deal of his-
torical support for the contention that the Church of Jesus Christ of  Latter-Day 
Saints, which made up the majority of Utahans at the time, did not wish to end the 
practice of polygamy and did so only when it received word that federal soldiers were 
on the march toward them.  LEONARD ARRINGTON AND DAVIS BITTON, THE MORMON EX-
PERIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 165-68 (Knopf 1979). 
164. Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d at 1068 n.3.
165. Id. at 1068.
166. Id.
167. United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir. 1997).
168. Id. at 1317.  The State of Nevada opposed this position, as did the states
of Alaska, Maine, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, and Vermont.  Id. n.1.  However, 
Nevada’s position might have been different had the livestock been on a different 
type of federal land, as the state had passed a law claiming ownership of all public 
lands within its boundaries, but had exempted national forest lands.  Id. n.2. 
169. Id. at 1318.
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E. Summary:  Equal Footing Jurisprudence
Despite its power, the equal footing doctrine has kept a low pro-
file.  It may be the least known doctrine to be a regular subject of Su-
preme Court decisions since the earliest days of the Union.  It 
evolved into two, non-equal branches, both having Constitutional 
roots.  The first branch of the doctrine to emerge was the less power-
ful one involving property rights, largely issues of title to submerged 
lands.  This branch, which has involved the majority of equal footing 
cases before the Court, has at its heart the holding that in order for 
the newer states to have the same rights and sovereign powers as the 
original thirteen, those states had to hold title to submerged lands, 
absent a pre-statehood grant of such lands to American Indian tribes 
by the federal government.  The second branch of the doctrine in-
volves the political rights of states, which the Court has stressed is 
more powerful than the protections offered to states regarding land 
ownership.  Attempts to limit or qualify the political rights and obli-
gations of the states is highly suspect under the equal footing doc-
trine. 
Both branches of the doctrine, however, are rooted in the Con-
stitution.  Since 1845, the Court has interpreted Article IV's provisions 
regarding the admission of states and the relationships between 
them as the constitutional underpinning of the equal footing doc-
trine.  That holding has been applied consistently since that time, 
and it is settled law.  What remains unsettled is whether CAA provi-
sions allowing California the right to regulate in areas that are for-
bidden to her sister states violate the doctrine. 
III. Application of Equal Footing Doctrine to the CAA and
California
When Congress passed the CAA in 1970, and when it amended 
the Act in 1977, it clearly intended to give to any state that had 
adopted certain emission control regulations before 1966 the power 
not just to keep those regulations, but to engage in further regulation 
of that industry.170  From the Congressional debates, it is clear that al-
though the statutory language did not specifically name California, 
justifications for the exception arose from concerns about California's 
air quality.171  That same regulatory power is explicitly denied to other 
states, as federal courts have ruled when some of the original states 
170. 42 U.S.C. 7543(a); 42 U.S.C. § 7542(b).
171. See, e.g., 91 Cong. Rec. 19224 (1970).
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attempted to exercise the same power.172  Although the Congresses 
that passed the original CAA and its 1977 amendments debated the 
fairness of giving one state powers denied to another, they did not 
debate whether they had the power under the Constitution to do so. 
As discussed below, under the equal footing doctrine, the Congresses 
did not. 
A. Questions of Constitutionality
In order to evaluate whether CAA provisions allowing California
regulatory power denied to other states is constitutional, it is neces-
sary to answer a question the Supreme Court has never directly faced: 
does Congress' power under the Commerce Clause allow it place re-
strictions on some states but not others? 
To answer that question, it is helpful to determine what limits 
the jurisprudence has established, due to the equal footing doctrine. 
From Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, we know Congress cannot use enabling 
acts to subject property in one state to laws different from that if the 
same property had lain in another state.173  From Pollard's Lessee v. 
Hagan, we know Congress cannot impose regulations on a new state 
unless the same regulations could be imposed upon the original 
states.174  From Permoli, we know that no political right can be a matter 
of federal law in one state unless it is a matter of federal law in all 
states.175  From Stearns, we know that the equality of states "may for-
bid any agreement or compact limiting or qualifying political rights or 
obligations."176  From Coyle we know that the "Republican Form of 
Government" clause of the Constitution does not give Congress the 
power to impose restrictions upon a new state which deprive it of the 
equal power to exercise "the residuum of sovereignty not delegated 
by the Constitution itself."  Finally, we know from Corvallis Sand that 
one state cannot be constrained by federal common law when an-
other state is "free to choose its own legal principles."177 
Given this background, there are at least two issues that must 
be determined in order to answer the question of ultimate constitu-
tionality of the CAA California provisions.  First, does the Commerce 
Clause embody a more expansive grant of power than the "Republi-
172. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Jorling, 710 F. Supp. 421, 432 (N.D.N.Y. 1989).; Virginia
v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1411-1412 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Am. Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Mass. Dep’t of
Envt’l Prot., 208 F.3d 1, 8 (1st. Cir. 2000).
173. 39 U.S. 353, 376 (1840).
174. 44 U.S. 212, 228-229 (1845).
175. 44 U.S. 589,  610 (1845).
176. 179 U.S. 223, 244-45 (1900).
177. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378
(1977). 
 West  Northwest, Vol. 13, No. 1, Winter 2007 
153 
can Form of Government" clause, allowing Congress to admit states 
or the judiciary's ability to impose federal common law, such that, 
unlike all these other powers, it may trump the constitutional basis 
for equal footing?  Second, if power is "conceded to Congress" over 
the states,178 can Congress selectively bestow it on a some states but 
not others — in other words, even if Congress cannot "take away" the 
powers of a single state, could it "give" its own powers to a single 
state? 
B. Commerce Clause vs. Republican Form of Government
The Supreme Court has held that the judiciary's inherent powers
to make the federal common law cannot override the equal footing 
doctrine.179  Likewise, the Court has held that Congress' duty guaran-
teeing each state a republican form of government does not allow it 
to override equal footing of the states.180  Thus, to argue that the 
Commerce Clause contains a power these two provisions does not, 
requires finding that the Commerce Clause was intended to be a 
broader or stronger grant of power than the power to guarantee a re-
publican form of government. 
The Commerce Clause power comes in Article I's list of Congres-
sional powers unrelated to the admission of new states; the republi-
can form of government clause is found in Article IV, which contains 
the full faith and credit clause, the provision requiring extradition 
among the states, the fugitive slave clause, the admission of states, 
and the Property Clause.  Thus, the republican form of government 
clause is found in the set of clauses generally providing for equality 
within and between the states.  Thus, if any clause would be seen as 
moderating the generality equality of each state, it would be the re-
publican form of government clause. 
The Supreme Court has never interpreted Article I powers of 
Congress as inherently greater than those in Article IV.  Moreover, al-
though the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate 
commerce "among the several States," it does not suggest that States 
can be treated differently, consistent with other provisions of the 
Constitution which require that the states be treated identically.  In 
fact, like the republican form of government clause, the Commerce 
Clause is placed near language indicating the equality of States. Art I, 
Section 8, clause 1 provides that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises 
shall be uniform throughout the United States."  Finally, and most 
damningly for the proposition that the Commerce Clause would al-
178. See Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. at 230.
179. Corvallis Sand, 429 U.S. at 378.
180. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. at 567.
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low different treatment of states, Article I, Section 9, Clause 6 of the 
Constitution states "No preference shall be given by any Regulation 
of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of an-
other."  This is underscored by the fact that the original Constitution 
provided for income to the national government though taxation of 
imports.181 
As the above discussion shows, the proposition that the Com-
merce Clause carries enough weight to overcome the presumption of 
equal footing is faulty. Not only is it a less obvious source of such 
power than the republican form of government clause, due to its 
placement in the Constitution, but the text limits the use of Com-
merce Clause power and proscribes equality of the states in its usage.  
Therefore, the constitutionality of the CAA vis-à-vis the equal footing 
doctrine cannot depend on Congressional exercise of the Commerce 
Clause. 
C. Can Congress Grant Differential Regulatory Powers?
The second argument in favor of the constitutionality of the CAA
California provisions is that Congress is not "taking" the sovereign 
powers of the state protected by the equal footing doctrine — it is se-
lectively bestowing its own power to regulate. 
The Supreme Court teaches that Congress may confer: 
upon the States an ability to restrict the flow of interstate 
commerce that they would not otherwise enjoy.  If Con-
gress ordains that the States may freely regulate an as-
pect of interstate commerce, any action taken by a State 
within the scope of the congressional authorization is 
rendered invulnerable to Commerce Clause challenge.182 
However, the Court has not ruled on the question of whether 
Congress may infer the power to regulate on a matter of interstate 
commerce on only one state — in other words, whether such a dele-
gation would be vulnerable to an equal footing clause challenge. 
Proponents of such an argument might point to jurisprudence 
allowing Congress to spend tax dollars for any purpose it deems nec-
essary and proper, without regard to equality between the states.183  
Analysis, however, would inevitably center on the differences be-
181. U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 1.
182. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S.
648, 652-53 (1981), quoting Lewis v. BT Inv't Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980); H. P. 
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 542-543 (1949). 
183. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (Congress can spend
tax dollars as long as it deems the expenditure to be necessary and proper). 
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tween the Commerce Clause and Congressional powers to appropri-
ate federal funds as it sees fit.  For instance, while the taxation clause 
has no accompanying restriction providing for equal treatment of the 
states, Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce does.  As 
discussed above, the Constitution provides that Congress cannot use 
its power to give preference to one state's ports over another.  In ad-
dition, the Court's federalism jurisprudence indicates a strong differ-
ence between the powers of Congress when appropriating funds and 
the power of Congress to regulate.  In New York v. United States, the 
Court noted that while the Congress may attach conditions to receiv-
ing federal funds, it cannot otherwise commandeer state legislative 
processes using its regulatory power under the Commerce Clause.184  
Therefore, the Commerce Clause does not appear to insulate federal 
law from a challenge under the equal footing doctrine. 
The best argument for Congress' ability to create an inequality 
of power through a post-statehood boon, even if it cannot do so by a 
pre-statehood restriction, is that the equal footing doctrine does not 
mean that states must have equal regulatory powers, only that they 
must have equal constitutional powers.  A proponent of the differing 
regulatory power would argue that California has the same constitu-
tional status of every other state, and that what is being given is an 
extra-constitutional power.  The argument would continue that po-
litical equality of states under the equal footing doctrine is restricted 
to constitutional powers, and does not require that the states have 
equal lawmaking powers within their borders. 
Ironically, the case that best refutes this argument is the case 
that clearly states the limits of the equal footing doctrine's political 
arm.  In United States v. Texas, the Supreme Court noted the parame-
ters:  economic, geographic, geologic, and area differences lay out-
side the doctrine — "political standing and sovereignty" were 
inside.185 
The CAA California provisions involve differences of political 
sovereignty, not geography or even air quality.  Congress did not 
choose to allow all states with air quality below a certain level the 
power to set these regulations; it allowed states  that had previously 
regulated air quality in certain ways to continue writing new regula-
tions, while forbidding the same privilege to those that had not al-
ready acted.  Congress conditioned new powers on the decision of 
the States to exercise their own sovereign powers.  The one state that 
had chosen to regulate in particular ways was given a power denied 
to all the states that had chosen not to exercise their equal right to 
184. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 145 (1992).
185. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950).
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do so.186  There is no provision allowing this power to disappear once 
California's air quality was brought in line with that of her sister 
states, nor is there a provision to allow a regulation by a state with 
air quality worse than California's.  These provisions are not about an 
inequality of economics or geography — they are about sovereignty. 
As such, they are the kind of provisions to which the equal footing 
doctrine is intended to apply. 
The soundness of this conclusion is underscored by an examina-
tion of the founders' intent.  Those founders who opposed adding 
"equal footing" language to the Constitution — men like Morris, 
Gerry, and King — did so because they feared that new states would 
come to have more power than the original 13.  The proponents of 
equal footing argued that they did not want discrimination; all the 
citizens of the new country should have the same rights.  The foun-
ders would have been united in their opposition to a newer state re-
ceiving regulatory powers denied to the original states.  The 
Constitution is devoid of language making distinctions between the 
powers of states, and several provisions expressly seek equal treat-
ment for all of them by Congress.  The first Congress, adopting in full 
the previous law passed under the Articles of Confederation, placed 
the equal footing doctrine into law, and did not pass laws that gave 
one state powers different from that of another.  The founders' nega-
tive opinion of the power of Congress to devolve special powers on 
California, therefore, can not be much in doubt. 
IV. Conclusion
The equal footing doctrine renders unconstitutional those pro-
visions of the CAA giving to California a right to regulate certain as-
pects of air quality, and denying that right to other states.  There are 
two potential outcomes: first, that attempts of other states like New 
York and Massachusetts to enact regulations that California has the 
power to enact should be permitted.187  If the federal government is 
186. In a potentially analogous case, the Supreme Court has rejected, as a vio-
lation of equal protection, a State’s legislative attempt to condition benefits on 
whether the potential recipient was a newcomer.  Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 
472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985).  Here it might be argued that Congress is attempting to 
condition benefits on whether the potential state was a newcomer to a field of regu-
lation, which would violate the equal footing doctrine. 
187. States attempting to regulate in these arenas would have standing to
raise a constitutional challenge to the equal footing doctrine.  Assuming New York 
and Massachusetts did not repeal the statutes imposing zero-emission controls fol-
lowing the court decisions, these states might now be able to bring such a challenge. 
In addition, automotive companies forced to comply with California’s regulations 
would likely have standing to challenge those regulations as an exercise of unconsti-
tutional power, assuming they argued that the delegation to a single state of Con-
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concerned that fifty or more regulatory enactments would be unwork-
able, there is a simple solution: it could promulgate two sets of stan-
dards, one more stringent than the other, and allow each state to 
choose between them.  The result, therefore, might be the status quo, 
except that California would not be given more powers than the other 
states. 
The equal footing doctrine has roots in laws that pre-date the 
Constitution.  The Court has recognized a Constitutional nexus for it, 
the first Congress placed it in a statute that is still applicable today, 
and the courts have repeatedly cited its fundamental nature to the 
political structure of the United States.  Though the majority of the 
cases throughout time have dealt with land ownership issues, the ju-
risprudence has always recognized that the most important feature of 
the doctrine is an assurance that each state would have the same 
sovereignty within its borders as every other state.  Just as this Union 
should have no second class citizens,188 it should have no second 
class states. 
gress’ power to regulate was a violation of the equal footing doctrine, and therefore 
would be void. 
188. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 922 (1986);
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware 
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911-912 (1982); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 583 (1979) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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